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TERRY L. ANDERSON*

The Market Alternative for
Hawaiian Watert
INTRODUCTION

Throughout the western United States, state legislatures are being forced
to reexamine their water laws. Growing demands from agricultural, municipal, industrial, and recreational uses are putting pressure on supplies
which cannot easily be augmented. In the past, states have turned to the
federal government and asked for dams and canals to capture and redistribute existing supplies. Pressure from environmentalists and fiscal conservatives, however, has put funding for standard pork-barrel water projects
in jeopardy. In the absence of this funding, institutional changes must be
considered, and some of the changes are relying more on water marketing.'

Hawaii is one of the western states having to face up to the reality of
increasing water scarcity. This scarcity appears most severe on Oahu
where, as early as 1929, an observed drop in the water table from 42
feet above sea level in 1880 to 23 feet in 1926 led to the formation of
the Honolulu Board of Water Supply. Since then economic and population
growth have brought total Oahu consumption to 470 million gallons per
day (mgd) in 1975, and projections for the year 2000 suggest this will
increase by twenty-one percent. Since agriculture, which consumed fiftytwo percent of the total in 1975, is unlikely to increase its demands and
may even decrease them, municipal uses will be the primary cause of
the projected increase in consumption. With an estimated sustainable
groundwater yield of 480 to 630 mgd and average stream discharge into
the sea of 430 mgd, there appears to be no aggregate shortage. However,
seasonal and regional variation in demand and supply have already created
temporary shortages for certain areas of the island.
Concern over how to improve water allocation and court interpretations
of existing water law have led the state to consider reforming its water
*Professor of Economics, Montana State University, and Senior Fellow, Political Economy Research Center, Bozeman, MT.
tAn earlier version of this article was presented as a paper at a conference entitled Hawaii's Water
Future:A Preview of Management Options, held in Honolulu in August 1984. c 1984 by the Pacific
Institute for Public Policy Research, 177 Post Street, San Francisco CA 94108.
1. For a more complete discussion of water marketing issues, see WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (T.L. Anderson, ed. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as WATER RIGHTS].
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institutions. In 1978, a constitutional convention amended Hawaii's Constitution requiring the legislature to create a water resources agency to
"control and regulate the use of Hawaii's water resources for the benefit
of its people." 2 Pursuant to this amendment, the 1982 legislature passed
Act 170 which established the Advisory Study Commission on Water
Resources for the purpose of formulating a water code for the state.
The key question facing this commission is not whether there will be
"enough" water, but how the finite amounts of water will be allocated.
As long as water is treated as a non-scarce good and priced below its
true value, there will never be enough water to meet continually growing
demands. Therefore, finite water supplies must be allocated.
The options for this allocation may be thought to lie on a continuum
with strictly political/bureaucratic allocation at one end and market allocation at the other. The former is represented by a system of short
duration, non-transferrable permits for water use determined by the political process. Market allocation is represented by a system of private,
tradeable water rights whose use is determined by individual owners
acting in the marketplace. Political allocation of water permits is sure to
generate conflicts, since granting a water permit to one user necessarily
precludes another. Market trades, on the other hand, require that both
parties benefit through the transaction. The issue to be settled by the
Hawaiian water code is which legal system along this continuum will
allocate Hawaiian water.
Hawaiian culture, tradition, and law provide precedent for adopting a
water code which emphasizes the market alternative with well-defined
and enforced water rights. The common law with its appurtenant rights
has allowed water to be traded from one use and place to another. On
the basis of historical precedent in common law, the state of Hawaii is
in a perfect position to opt for a system of water rights which encourages
cooperative trades and meet its constitutional mandate to "control and
regulate the use of Hawaii's water resources for the benefit of its people."
Such a system would provide both security and flexibility which, in turn,
would promote cooperation and efficiency in water use.
This article is aimed at generating a dialogue about the efficacy of a
private water rights system. The first section discusses some fundamentals
of the market process and the difficulties of central planning for water
use. The paper then reviews the historical and legal development of
Hawaii's institutions governing water use and finds that there is ample
precedent for a market based water code. Finally, essential elements in
the development of a Hawaiian water code based on market allocation
are addressed.
2. Hawaii Const. art. X1, § 7.
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THE NATURE OF MARKETS
The complex nature of the market process is often taken for granted.
This process is one where individual subjective preferences (demand) are
brought together with specific information about inputs and how they can
be combined to fulfill demands (supply). Given the millions of decisions
that go into this process on both sides of the market, it is virtually
impossible to comprehend how the inputs necessary to produce bread,
automobiles, toothpaste, or books are brought together to meet consumer
demands. Nonetheless, one does not worry about whether these products
will be available because the market process effectively coordinates supply
and demand.
The coordination of supply and demand in the marketplace is accomplished through mutually beneficial trades where individuals on both sides
of the transaction are motivated by the desire for gain. Suppliers produce
goods or services to make a profit. The bargain hunting consumer is also
attempting to profit by purchasing at a price below its actual value to
him. Therefore, prices provide important information to both producers
and consumers which help guide both to efficiency-enhancing trades.
Consider the market for gasoline. When real energy prices rose during
the late 1970s, consumers found gasoline less of a bargain and responded
by reducing consumption. At the same time, high prices signaled to
producers that profits could be made. The producers responded by increasing gasoline supplies, and this, in turn, eliminated the gasoline
shortages so evident in 1973-74. An apparently unresolvable energy crisis
was solved through the coordinating market process.
Before considering how this process might be applied to water, there
are two important characteristics of demand and supply which must be
recognized. First, on the demand side there are substitutes. When the
price of gasoline rose, people made adjustments by finding alternatives.
This meant driving smaller cars, driving less, and moving closer to work
locations. The price responses led to a much greater change in energy
consumption than was initially expected.
The same result is likely if water prices rise. For municipal uses, the
evidence suggests that a ten percent increase in the price of water would
produce between a 3.75 to a 12.63 percent decrease in municipal water
consumption. 3 Similar data suggest that the agricultural sector demand
for water is even more price-responsive.' The data in Table 1 show that
industrial users of water have technologies available to them that would
3. Beattie & Foster, Jr., Can Prices Tame the Inflationary Tiger?, 72 J. AM. WATER WORKS A.
444-45 (Aug. 1980).
4. See Gardner, Water Pricing and Rent Seeking in CaliforniaAgriculture, in WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 83-114.
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allow substitution in productive processes. For example, electricity can
be generated using wet or dry cooling technology. The former requires
much larger quantities of water and is used where water is cheap. The
latter requires very little water because capital is substituted for water,
but the substitution is costly and therefore used only when water is expensive. Because there are substitutes for water in all uses, in developing
water policy it is important to recognize that "needs" are conditioned by
price and that both consumers and producers are responsive to price
changes.
Table 1. VARIANCE IN INDUSTRIAL UNIT WATER WITHDRAWAL
Product or User and Unit

Steam-electric power
(kw-h.)
Petroleum refining (gallon
of crude oil)
Steel (finished ton)
Soaps, edible oils (pound)
Carbon black (pound)
Natural rubber (pound)
Butadiene (pound)
Glass containers (ton)
Automobiles (per car)
Trucks, buses (per unit)

Maximum

170
44.5
65,000
7.5
14
6
305
667
16,000
20,000

Source: Hudson & Abu-Lughod, Water Requirements, 45

Draft (in gallons)
Typical

80
18.3
40,000
4
160
WATER FOR INDUSTRY 19-21

Minimum

1.32
1.73
1,400
1.57
0.25
2.54
13
118
12,000
15,000
(J.B. Graham

& MF. Burrill, eds. 1956).

Second, on the supply side, policy must account for the fact that costs
are determined by opportunities foregone. The cost of supplying water
to a particular user is not only the capital and labor expenditures necessary
to deliver the liquid, but also includes the opportunity cost or opportunities
sacrificed by putting the water to that use. Water delivered for irrigation
diminishes the amount of instream water flow, thus diminishing water
availability for municipal consumption, industrial production, and environmental amenities. These opportunity costs must be taken into account
in determining beneficial uses.
The combination of demand responsiveness to price and the consideration of opportunity costs by suppliers can come together in the market
place to generate efficiency in water allocation. Typically, in markets
when prices change, small or marginal adjustments follow. For water,
these adjustments would take place incrementally as users moved relatively small amounts of water from lower valued uses to higher valued
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uses. Such movements would continue until the value of an additional
unit of water in one use was equal to the value of an additional unit in
another use. It is not a question of whether all water will be used in
agriculture, industry, or domestic uses, but how water usage will adjust
between these uses. As prices equalize among uses, domestic users will
water their lawns less, farmers will change cropping patterns, and industrial users will recycle their water. The concern is always expressed
that if markets are allowed to allocate water, some group of users will
have to do without. How can farmers compete with large corporations?
Will not energy producers purchase all the water? None of these questions
focuses on how allocation actually takes place. There will not be an allor-nothing allocation of water. In the American West, over eighty percent
of all water is consumed in agriculture. If prices rise because of increased
industrial or energy demands, western agricultural consumption might
fall by ten or even twenty percent. The result, however, would not be
that food would no longer be produced. To reiterate, markets induce
people to make incremental adjustments to prices based on their opportunity costs and available alternatives. These adjustments take place as
both demanders and suppliers attempt to exploit potential gains from
trading within the market.
Requirements for the Market Process
A system of well-defined, enforced, and transferable property rights
must exist in order for efficient incremental adjustments to take place and
for gains from trade to result. It has been argued that "in designing a
water management system there are two primary goals: flexibility and
security. 5 Well-defined and enforced property rights provide this security
which in turn encourages wise use, conservation, and capital investment.
Secure property rights are at the heart of our market system. Security
insures that the owner/decisionmaker who husbands his land, improves
his home, or conserves his water, is rewarded. The water code chosen
by Hawaii must recognize the importance of this security.
The management system should also provide flexibility and this can
be obtained through the transferability of rights. The possibility of transfer
forces owners to consider opportunity costs carefully. To give up selling
a water right is to forego the value of that alternative. If transferability
is not possible, there is nothing to make the owner consider these opportunity costs. In a dynamic society with continually changing values,
it is this tranferability which insures flexibility. Entrepreneurs continually
have new and better ideas of how to utilize resources. It is their offers
5. Chang, Hawaii's Water Agenda, in GROUNDWATER IN HAWAII: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 141,

144 (F.N. Fujimura & W.B.C. Chang, eds. 1981).
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to buy and sell these resources that generate progress. If transferability
is not allowed, there is no effective way for the system to respond to
changes in demand and supply.
The establishment of secure and transferable water rights is the key to
an efficient market allocation in the absence of an omniscient, benevolent
dictator. As Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek has pointed out, the fundamental problem society faces is "the utilization of knowledge which is
not given to anyone in its totality." 6 The point Hayek is making is that
the information necessary to make tradeoffs between uses is difficult, if
not impossible, to obtain in the absence of markets, property rights, and
prices. Economists can draw demand and supply curves as stylized representations of markets, but knowing exactly how consumers and producers will respond to price changes is impossible. There is no way that
a well-intentioned bureaucrat can know what constitutes a beneficial use
without market transactions. It is the trading of well-defined and enforced
property rights which will enable individuals with "the knowledge of the
particular circumstances of time and place" 7 to coordinate their knowledge. The same process which we take for granted in the allocation of
so many goods and services we consume can also be applied to water.

Criticisms of the Market Process
At this point, the skeptic often argues that markets sound good in
theory, but they cannot work in practice. The argument is that markets
do not perform "perfectly" all of the time and, therefore, must be strictly
controlled or eliminated. There are three basic causes which underlie the
alleged imperfection. First, market transactions for water will impair
third-parties. For example, if a groundwater user withdraws and sells
large quantities of water from a basin and thereby raises the depth from
which water must be lifted by other pumpers, he has impaired the others.
The problem in this instance is that water rights have not been welldefined and enforced. If the rights of other pumpers were clear, the
withdrawals would be precluded without compensation of those impaired.
Therefore, the existence of third-party impairment can be eliminated with
more careful attention to the establishment of water rights. In those cases
where this cannot occur, an argument can be made for some regulation.
In the past, however, this argument has been accepted too quickly without
enough attention being given to the property right alternatives.
The second alleged cause of market failure is that the distribution of
income is unequal so that only the rich can participate in the market.
6. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcON. REV. 519, 520 (Sept. 1945).
7. Id. at 521.
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The negative aspects of such a free-market system are obvious. The
rich would get richer. Those with money could always buy the water
rights of those who have water. In a water shortage situation, this
would mean that the wealthy would have water while others may
not.

Certainly the distribution of wealth does not allow everyone to compete
equally in the marketplace. But it does not follow that only the rich would
have water. Although markets allocate food, the rich do not have all of
the food. Similarly markets allocate energy, but the rich do not have all
of the energy. Diminishing returns in water use will limit the amount that
anybody, rich or poor, will desire. Even if we accept that everyone cannot
compete equally because of income differences, the problem is the distribution of income, and not water markets. If it is collectively decided
that lower income people should have more water, this goal can be
accomplished without eliminating water markets.
The final alleged cause of market failure is that private water supplies
would constitute a natural monopoly, which would allow suppliers to
charge high prices for the resource. The great western water explorer,

John Wesley Powell, was concerned with "the danger of an evil monopoly
which would charge an exploitative price and force the homesteader to
pay a heavy tribute." 9 In the American West, farmers were especially
concerned that irrigation companies which charged a royalty or bonus for
water would be in a position to refuse delivery of water and extract a
monopoly payment. In 1886, when Byron Wheeler of Colorado refused
to pay the High Line Canal its royalty and delivery was refused, the
Colorado farmers sought legislation to control canal companies. The State
Farmer's Irrigation and Protection Association contended that corporateowned canal companies were common carriers just like railroads and,
therefore, could only charge a fee for transporting the water and that such
a fee was subject to state regulation. This group contended that the
monopoly position of canal companies was "choking the life" out of
agriculture through "an extortion which is unbearable.""0 Such arguments
won the day throughout the American West and resulted in a morass of
regulations governing water marketing.
In retrospect, the fear that water markets would result in monopolies
has had little empirical basis. The fact that nearly ninety percent of the
commercial companies were in financial distress by the turn of the century
does not suggest an industry earning large profits from monopoly power.
Furthermore, those commercial companies that were the only suppliers
8. Chang, supra note 5, at 144.
9. Quoted in R.M. Alston, Commercial Irrigation Enterprise: The Fear of Water Monopoly and
the Genesis of Market Distortion 129 (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1970).
10. R.G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 26 (1983).
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of water to a particular region had only one group of buyers. This situation
led to monopoly powers for both farmers and water companies and forced
them to bargain over the price of water. Moreover, if water companies
are to execute monopoly power, they must withhold their product from
the market, an action requiring large storage facilities which most companies do not have. Finally, when companies have tried to exert their
market power, competition has emerged as the most significant deterrent
to market power. I" We must always remember that competition only
requires two parties. Today, water rights in Hawaii as well as on the
mainland are dispersed widely enough that monopoly power is not likely
to be a significant problem.
Prospectsof Governmental Failure
Accepting the argument that markets are not perfect is not sufficient
reason to reject the market alternative. One must be careful not to commit
the "grass is greener" fallacy, and rely completely on a politically based
allocation system. The problem is that governmental allocation of resources is as likely, if not more likely, to fail as is the market. There are
several reasons for this:' 2
1. Voter ignorance and imperfect information. In a democratic society,
where it is unlikely that any one voter, even a well-informed one, can
influence the outcome of the political process, the benefits of being wellinformed cannot be fully captured by the individual. At the same time,
obtaining information about candidates and issues is costly for the voter.
Thus, voters remain rationally ignorant; that is, they do not undergo great
costs to obtain information except on issues that are important to them
personally.
2. Special interest effects. The voters who do become well-informed
and politically active on any issue tend to be those who will benefit from
a particular governmental action. With benefits concentrated on a few
recipients, it is worth the recipient group's time to try to bring about
specific governmental action. Since the costs of governmental action,
such as subsidies, transfer payments, tariffs, regulations, tend to be diffused over the entire population of taxpayers, any action costs each individual so little that it is not worth his time to organize an opposition.
Well-informed and articulate interest groups will dominate the political
process and receive political favors when benefits are concentrated and
costs diffused.
3. Short-sightedeffects. Politicians who must face the electorate every
few years tend to be more concerned with the short-run rather than with
11. Id. at 18-35, discusses competition in more detail.
12. For a more complete discussion of governmental failure, see J. GWARTNEY & R. STRoUP,
ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 631-48 (3d ed. 1983).
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the long-run. They will have little interest in policies that are efficient
but take time to produce results. This can be contrasted with the market,
which is often alleged to have no concern for the future. With secure
property rights, owners have an incentive to compare present and future
values and conserve when appropriate. The possibility of speculation in
the market place, further, gives future demanders an indirect voice, since
the speculator is buying today with the prospect of selling at a higher
price tomorrow. In the political arena, it is much more difficult for future
voices to be heard, because they cannot vote. The politician needs only
to be concerned with the preferences of current voters, but the property
owner must consider potential future values as well.
4. Little incentivefor candidatesto accountfor individualpreferences.
In the marketplace, consumers are generally able to tailor their purchases
very closely to their own preferences, and each individual gets the particular kind of product he wants. In the political marketplace, however,
voters must decide on alternative bundles of governmental expenditure
and tax proposals offered by competing politicians. There is no opportunity for individuals to select on an issue level. To capture as many votes
as possible, the candidates' policy bundles tend to reflect a majority
coalition, and not the wishes of individual voters.
These characteristics of the political sector are likely to generate governmental failure and inefficiency. Furthermore, entrepreneurial talents
are expended by interest groups trying to influence decisions and by
politicians and bureaucrats trying to fill niches. The most obvious examples of governmental failure in water resource management include
energy policies that promote coal gasification and other synfuel projects
that require large quantities of water, construction of costly dams that
cannot pass the cost-benefit test, and subsidized delivery of water which
encourages waste.
The establishment of a water allocation system in Hawaii must take
account of governmental failure and the potential for third-party impairment in the market process. A system of well-defined, enforced, and
transferable water rights can do this. Such a system affords both security
and flexibility. It would face water users with the incentive to use the
resource efficiently and give them information in the form of prices on
which to make efficient allocation decisions.
REVIEWING THE PAST
Water Rights Before McBryde v. Robinson
In devising a new water code for Hawaii, it is useful to understand
how water marketing has worked in the past and to examine what precedent there is for well-established and transferable water rights. On the
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mainland in the American West, the doctrine of prior appropriation has
served as the foundation for water allocation. This doctrine was based
on "the recognition of discovery, followed by prior appropriation, as the
inception of a possessor's title, and the development by working the
claim as the condition of its retention." 13 Prior appropriation provided
the essential ingredients for an efficient market in water. The rights to
water were clearly assigned, and the owner was forced to bear the cost
but was able to reap the benefits of his decisions. Mistakes were undoubtedly made, but water rights owners had an incentive to learn from
their mistakes and improve on water allocation in the process.
Institutions such as prior appropriation evolve in response to changing
resource endowments.14 For institutions such as these, necessity is often
the mother of invention. As long as resources are abundant, there is no
need for anyone to devote much effort to the definition and enforcement
of water rights. To the frontiersman entering the Great Plains, it was clear
from the start that access to water was a prime settlement location criterion. Abundant riparian locations during the early years meant that the
riparian water laws of the East were sufficient. As population grew,
however, land with available water became increasingly scarce. Mining
technology and irrigation required that water be taken from the streams
and moved to non-riparian locations. With growing scarcity, it paid individuals to invest in developing a new system of water rights that would
accommodate changes. Eventually, the riparian doctrine was replaced
with prior appropriation.
The history of water on the Hawaiian Islands and Hawaii's system of
appurtenant water rights bear many similarities to the American West.
Prior to the arrival of Europeans, native Hawaiians did not put much
stress on the water resources of the islands.
Although the native Hawaiians had occasionally transported water through
their auwais (ditches) to dry areas . . ., they had not engaged in the
massive irrigation projects required by the sugar industry. The Hawaiian
approach to water use had been one of sharing the resource to promote
agriculture. 5
As the demands for water use in the taro fields and later on the sugar
plantations grew, however, this "sharing" of the resource was not an
adequate allocation mechanism. At this point, individuals began to put
additional time and effort into the definition and enforcement of water
13. 1 C. KINNEY, LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS AND ARID REGION DOCTRINE OF APPROPRIATION OF WATERS 598 (2nd ed. 1912).
14. See Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18
J. LAW & ECON. 163, 163-79 (1975).

15. VanDyke, Growth Management, Land Use, and Water Rights, in GROUNDWATER
A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 206, 215 (1981).

IN HAWAII:

October 19851

HAWAIIAN WATER: MARKET ALTERNATIVE

rights. In other words, as the value of water increased, it paid people to
secure rights to that valuable resource.
The current system of water rights which evolved through court decisions "is based upon and is the outgrowth of ancient Hawaiian customs
and the methods of Hawaiians in dealing with the subject of water." 16
From these ancient customs came a system of water rights that were
clearly defined and that allowed enough flexibility to get the water moved
from the windward to the leeward sides of the islands. These rights were
not derived fron any administrative system, but rather came from customs
governing land and water use. Over time, these customs became a part
of the common law as disputes were adjudicated in the courts."
The appurtenant rights in Hawaii had both the security and flexibility
discussed above. Water rights were defined on the basis of water used in
taro production at the time of the Great Mahale, I8 and gave their owner
a relatively clear idea of what he possessed. Conflicts over ownership
did arise, but were settled by the Commissioners of Private Ways and
Water Privileges during the late 1800s and later by territorial courts. As
a result, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a set of
water institutions evolved in Hawaii which promoted water allocation
without a large bureaucratic administrative structure.
As sugarcane replaced taro as the main agricultural crop, it became
apparent that the appurtenant rights had to be modified to allow for
changes in purpose and points of use. In 1867, Peck v. Bailey 9 held that
"when a party has the right of water, he can use it for any purpose,
although different from the original use," as long as the change did not
impair other users along the watercourse. Similarly, the Hawaiian courts
found no reason to interfere with points and methods of diversion so long
as third parties were not injured.
It has been held that water appurtenant to land for household purposes
may be put to a different use; that water appurtenant to one piece of
land may be used on another piece provided no one's rights are
infringed by the change; and that improved methods for diverting
water may be made use of upon like condition.20
This meant that there were disputes and court cases to determine whether
there was third-party impairment but, in general, water transfers were
16. Territory of Hawaii v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 395 (1930).
17. See W.A. HUTCHINS, THE HAWAIIAN SYSTEM OF WATER RIGHTS, 4748 (1946).
18. The Great Mahele generally refers to the event of 1848 when Kamehameha III and more than
240 of the highest chiefs came together and settled their undivided interests in the lands within the
islands by means of various quitclaim deeds. The Great Mahele is also considered to include the
division of the lands reserved by King Kamehameha I11into Crown and government lands.
19. 8 Hawaii 658, 666 (1867).
20. Carter v. Territory of Hawaii, 24 Hawaii 47, 69 (1917).
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allowed. In 1946, Wells Hutchins characterized the state of Hawaiian
water rights regarding transfers:
The conditions which are imposed upon the exercise of a water right
are intended to safeguard the rights of others who depend upon the
same source of water supply. Alternation of conditions is not allowed
if the result is to injure others; but so long as others are not hurt,
there is no valid reason for denying the holder of the water right the
privilege of bettering his own situation.2
In 1959, the Hawaii Water Authority came to a similar conclusion:
"Surface water rights in Hawaii are considered property rights and can
be sold or acquired separately from the land to which they are appurtenant." 22 Water rights were well-defined and enforced, and it was up to
the owner to determine if and when location or use of water should be
changed. In Hawaii, even the rights to surplus water were clearly defined.
These waters of an ahupuaaz3 were not appurtenant, "but were the property of the konohiki to do with as he pleased.",2 4 Even these waters could
be separated from the ahupuaa and conveyed by the konohiki to others
outside the ahupuaa.
The legal right in Hawaii to transport surface water from one watershed to another, not permitted under riparian water law, has made
it possible to provide irrigation to Hawaii's water-deficient and generally better arable lands and develop a sound agricultural economy.
Extensive developments of surface water have been accomplished
under Hawaii's existing surface-water rights law. It can be concluded
that the many court decisions have firmly established the principles
of surface-water rights in Hawaii. It does not seem likely that any
legislation enacted to materially alter existing surfacewater rights law
would be held constitutional by Hawaii's courts nor does there appear
any need at this time for legislation to strengthen or change this
system of surface water law.25
Water rights under the Hawaiian system prior to McBryde Sugar Company v. Robinson" encouraged efficient allocation of water. The market
for water signaled to buyers and sellers what water was worth in other
21. HUTCHINS, supra note 17, at 134.

22.

HAWAII WATER AUTHORITY, WATER RESOURCES IN HAWAII 64

(1959).

23. An Ahupuaa was the division of land within the Hawaiian Islands, next in size to the district,
which has been known variously as the moku, apana, or kalana. Although often mentioned as the
unit of lands, the ahupuaa was not a measure of an area, for ahupuaas varied in size from 100 to
100,000 acres. They were generally pie-shaped parcels originating at the top of a mountain and
extending to the sea.
24. HUTCHINS, supra note 17, at 99. The konhiki originally referred to an agent, the person in
charge of a tract of land on behalf of the king or a chief. In later statutes, the chiefs or landlords
were referred to as konohikis.

25.

HAWAIIAN WATER AUTHORITY,

26. 504 P.2d 1330 (1973).

supra note 22, at 64-65.
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uses and other locations. Property rights gave the owners the incentive
to allocate water to its highest valued use. Millions of dollars were invested privately in collection and delivery systems and thousands of acres
and people were supplied with water. All of this development occurred
with a minimum of bureaucratic administration and planning. Individual
entrepreneurs working throughout the market process "planned" how and
where water was to be used and were flexible enough to adjust to changing
demand and supply conditions. As a result, many of the water diversions
"turned uninhabited and unproductive lands into productive fields of
sugarcane."" These rights were not derived from any administrative
system, but were derived from customs governing land and water use.
This system has played a very important role in giving Hawaii a water
management system that has enough security and flexibility to encourage
efficient water allocation.
Water Rights After McBryde v. Robinson
The system which evolved before 1973 provided Hawaiian water owners with secure rights which were traded in the marketplace, but a state
supreme court decision in that year overturned this longstanding system.
This case was filed for the purpose of determining water rights of parties
who owned land in the Hanapepe Valley on the island of Kauai. The
dispute was between two private landowners and water users over who
had the right to divert certain quantities of water from the Hanapepe
River. Because both were diverting large quantities, the river was practically dry throughout the year at its mouth. The original case was not
that unusual, because it was aimed at clarifying private rights under the
system described above.
What was unusual was the ruling by the state supreme court that the
"state was the owner of water flowing in the Koula stream and Hanapepe
river and landowners, having either or both riparian or appurtenant water
rights, had right to the use of the water, but not property in the water
itself." 28 In essence, the court followed the precedent of many western
states and said that the water in Hawaii belongs to the people for their
common use. The sugar companies, which had invested large sums of
capital in irrigation projects on the assumption that they had vested water
rights, found the ruling totally unacceptable. Hence, the state supreme
court ruling was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
After the initial state supreme court ruling, all parties began trying to
determine how they could reconcile the pre-McBryde water rights system
27. VanDyke, supra note 15, at 215.
28. 504 P.2d 1330 (1973).
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with post-McBryde state ownership of water. This led to the 1978 constitutional amendment charging the legislature with formulating a new
water policy. The response by the legislature was to establish the Advisory
Study Commission on Water Resources which drafted several alternative
water codes for the legislature to consider. These alternative codes ranged
from short-term permits for water use renewable at the discretion of a
state water agency to perpetual permits.
The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association (HSPA) became particularly
concerned with the legislative efforts. Testimony presented on their behalf
before the Joint Senate Committee on November 6, 1979 pointed out that
the sugar plantations "have a significant background of experience in
water resource development and management" which was "accomplished
by private enterprise under limited government scrutiny and permitted
the agricultural economy of the islands to develop to its present status. 9
The sugar planters felt that the historical Hawaiian water rights system
afforded the necessary security and flexibility to allocate the islands' water,
and that if private rights were not recognized, future water development
would be thwarted. The HSPA contended that until the Ninth Circuit ruled
on the case "it is impossible to define the 'private rights' to the use of
water. Such private right must be recognized and protected in any water
code adopted, otherwise the courts will find such legislation unconstitutional." 30 Such arguments successfully postponed the adoption of any
water code.
On February 20, 1985, the U.S. Court of Appeals overturned the
McBryde decision on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional taking
of vested private water rights.3 With this ruling, it would appear that
Hawaii has returned to the pre-McBryde water system, but the legislature
is still bound by constitutional amendment to establish an agency which
will "control and regulate the use of Hawaii's water resources for the
benefit of its people." The question to be answered by future Hawaiian
legislatures is whether the state will codify the pre-McBryde system and
leave allocation to the market process.
THE MARKET ALTERNATIVE
There are three specific aspects of water use which must be considered
if the new Hawaiian water code is to be market based: (1) diversion of
surface water, (2) instream flows, and (3) groundwater. Consider these
in turn. Water rights must be clearly specified in terms of the quantity
29. Testimony of R.H. Cox on behalf of Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association before Joint Senate
Committee Hearing 3 (Nov. 6, 1979).
30. Id. at 5.
31. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 P.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985).
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and priority of diversion for an effective water market to operate. Both
the appurtenant rights in Hawaii and the prior appropriations system on
the mainland offer a basis for providing well-defined and enforced water
rights. There is concern for third-party impairment as the result of return
flows, but this problem, for the most part, can be handled by defining
the rights in terms of consumption rights rather than diversion rights.32
When water is diverted, usually only a percentage is actually consumed
and the rest is returned to the stream. These return flows are then claimed
by others. Therefore, if an upstream user were to increase the percentage
consumed, the downstream claimant would be harmed. By defining rights
in terms of consumption rather than diversion, rights will be secure and
third party impairment can be avoided. In developing the water code,
one of the most important positive steps that can be taken is to allow
transferability of these consumption rights. As long as third-party impairment is guarded against, the transferability of secure water rights will
allow users to respond to changing water values. If higher valued uses
are found, the owner can move his water to those uses or sell it to someone
who will. In this way, flexibility will be promoted.
The second problem of instream flows33 is complicated because of the
free rider problem. This problem occurs when it is costly to exclude
nonpayers who enjoy the environmental amenities from instream flows.
Furthermore, instream flow claims significantly reduce the possibility of
other transfers and hence, flexibility of diversion uses.34 To understand
how flexibility is reduced, imagine a stream where someone, public or
private, claims the entire flow at a certain point. In that case, no user
downstream from that point could move his diversion and consumption
above the instream flow claim because that would reduce the flow and
thereby impair the instream flow claimant. This problem is worse on the
mainland where streams are longer and where there is more potential for
upstream uses. In Hawaii, where streams are relatively short and where
there are few upstream uses in the extremely steep mountains, precluding
upstream transfers is not such a problem.
It should also be noted that private organizations such as Trout Unlimited, Ducks Unlimited, and The Nature Conservancy offer a way around
the free rider problems. These groups pool the money of potential free
riders and use it to purchase natural resources which provide environ32. For a more complete discussion of consumption rights, see Gisser & Johnson, Institutional
Restrictions on the Transfer of Water Rights and the Survival of an Agency in WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 137-65; and Williams, Optimizing Water Use: The Return Flow Issue, 44 U. COLO. L.
REV. 301, 301-20 (1973).
33. An instream flow refers to water left within the confine of a stream's banks for the purpose
of providing environmental amenities.
34. For a more complete discussion of how markets might handle instream flows, see Anderson
& Johnson, The Problem of Instream Flows, in ECONOMIC INQUIRY (forthcoming).
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mental amenities. The Nature Conservancy, in particular, has collected
significant resources on the mainland and in Hawaii to purchase land and
protect its environmental quality. In Colorado, it has purchased rights to
divert water and turned them over to the state to be left in Boulder Creek.
If instream flows could be privately owned, there is no reason to believe
that such organizations would not devote more of their efforts to protecting
instream flows. The important thing in drafting the code, with respect to
instream flows, is to recognize instream flows as a beneficial use and to
make some provisions for private claims. Because hydroelectric generating facilities require an instream flow, the law governing hydroelectric
water rights provides some guidance for how instream flow rights might
be established.35
Groundwater allocation also presents some special problems. It is difficult to determine the boundaries of the basin as well as the stocks and
flows of groundwater. Fortunately, hydrologists have developed more
information which helps quantify the resource. Once quantified, rights
to stocks and flows can be specified. Individuals would then have a secure
right to a specific quantity of water stored underground and to a quantity
flowing in. If only the flow were used, the level of water in the basin
would not change. However, if it were economical, stocks might also be
drawn down.36 Specifying the rights to stocks and flows would encourage
more conservation of groundwater resources than the current system which
simply leaves "every man for himself."
In drafting Hawaii's water code, continued attention must be focused
on providing security and flexibility. Well-defined and enforced water
rights with assurance against third-party impairment will provide the
necessary security; transferability of rights will provide flexibility.
CONCLUSION
In adopting its new water code, Hawaii must attempt to develop institutions which will enable it to avoid the water crisis so feared throughout
the rest of the country. This crisis exists because demands exceed supplies
as a result of artificially low water prices. Costs of delivering water in
sufficient quantity and quality have often been subsidized so the user does
not have to pay the full price. These lower prices have encouraged inefficient and wasteful practices and developed a society dependent on
cheap water." In this sense, the water crisis is much like the energy crisis.
35. Id.
36. For a more complete discussion of groundwater rights, see Anderson, Burt & Fractor, Privatizing Groundwater Basins:A Model and Its Application in WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 22348.
37. For an excellent discussion of inefficiencies caused by artificially low water prices, see F.
WELSCH, How TO CREATE A WATER CRISIS (1985).
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Once price controls were lifted from energy and the market was allowed
to allocate that resource, shortages basically disappeared. The same can
happen if the market alternative is applied to water.
There appears to be a marked shift on the mainland toward more interest
in the market allocation of water. At the Department of the Interior, several
studies are being undertaken to determine how the market can play a
greater role in allocating Bureau of Reclamation water. 38 The Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California (MWD) and the Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) are putting pressure on the Bureau of Reclamation
to allow farmers in the Imperial Irrigation District receiving water from
the Bureau to trade that water with the cities of Los Angeles and San
Diego. A study by EDF has shown that improved water conservation
techniques in the Imperial Irrigation District can save approximately 450,000
acre-feet of water per year.39 These conservation techniques would include
the construction of more efficient irrigation facilities and different irrigation management practices. The physical improvements would include
lining canals, expanding seepage recovery systems, constructing more
regulatory reservoirs, expanding electronic control, and providing more
flexible deliveries. On-farm improvements would include expanding the
use of tailwater recovery systems and improving irrigation techniques
regarding leech water." The MWD could finance these improvements in
return for the water, and it now appears that this trade is quite feasible.
At the same time, states seem to be moving more in the direction of
water marketing. Montana, for example, has recently passed water marketing legislation focused on both intra and interstate transactions. 4 New
Mexico has a structure of water rights that very definitely encourages
market allocation; state water engineer Steve Reynolds has protected
against third-party impairment but has basically allowed markets to determine what constitutes a beneficial use. The states of California and
Oklahoma are piloting groundwater rights programs aimed at reducing
governmental involvement and encouraging conservation. There is ample
and growing precedent for the market alternative for water allocation.
Hawaii is in a perfect position to capitalize on this precedent and become
a leader in the development of a market-oriented water law.
There simply is no substitute for the market process. As demands grow,
the allocation problems and the necessary information to solve them
become more and more complex. It will be impossible for special water
38. For an example, see Wahn & Osterhoudt, Transactionsin Water, NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY
1985 (U.S. Geological Survey forthcoming).
39. R. STAVINS, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER XIX (March 1983) (prepared
for Environmental Defense Fund).
40. Id. at 46.
41. 1985 Mont. Laws 573.

910

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

masters, state water engineers, or water commissions to perform a balancing act. Demand will exceed supply and conflict will inevitably result.
Although some third-party effects must be addressed through legislation,
adjudication, and regulation, the majority of water allocation in Hawaii
can be handled through the market process. If Hawaii chooses to follow
the bureaucratic path of other states, it will have a static water code which
generates a great deal of conflict. On the other hand, Hawaii can become
a leader by developing a code based on the system of water rights in
effect prior to McBryde. Such a legal system would provide both security
and flexibility, which in turn could promote cooperation and efficiency.

